We’ll kick off EuropeWeek with the biggest topic in British-European policy; The Lisbon Treaty. Let’s look at how it’s been handled rather than what it entails; we’ll save that one for later.

In 2004, the European Union underwent a “Big Bang” enlargement and added 10 Eastern European countries to its membership list. Meanwhile, the Convention on the Future of Europe met to draft what was known was the Constitutional Treaty. The aim was to scrap the previous treaties; Nice (2001), Amsterdam (1997), and Maastricht (1992), going right the way back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and start anew with a comprehensive Constitution for the EU in the globalised world.

It didn’t quite pan out like that.

In Britain, all the main parties promised a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty during the ratification process in their manifesto. As the Constitutional Treaty made it’s way across Europe, it became more and more clear that it wouldn’t fly. The Dutch rejected it, as did the French, as did the Irish. By this time, it was called off for a redrafting. The British Government decided that there was no point kicking a dead Treaty, and so called off any referendum. There is little point in rejecting something that has already been rejected, apart from adding insult to injury.

Thus was born the Lisbon Treaty. Instead of a grand project for the EU, the Commission had to return to the traditional tinkering with an old engine and created a Reform treaty to amend the previous treaties. A much more modest scheme than before; it kept the necessary bits that would help the EU to cope with so many new (and vastly different) members while removing the bits people were upset about.

The problem is that the People weren’t really talking about Constitutions and enlargement and other lofty EU issues. They were talking about other things, this is the inherent problem with referenda.

In Ireland, the ‘No’ vote was successful because of some fears over abortion laws (or something like that). In France, the ‘No’ result was attributed to fears of an invading Polish Plumber who would steal French jobs, in a country which terminally has about 8% unemployment. The French also wanted to tell Jacques Chirac how useless he was.

It seems very democratic to have a referendum; it’s almost as democratic as a proper election. Who better to decide anything other than The People? The trouble is that The People don’t answer your question if they have something else to say.

France likes to have referenda because it knows that the actual subject doesn’t matter. It doesn’t make a difference what the implications of saying ‘non’ are, it’s just fun to do. Charles de Gaulle was brought down in a referendum in 1969 over a trivial amendment to the Constitution, which through the campaign became a Confidence Vote.

Likewise, in 1992, on Maastricht, the French passed the Treaty. President François Mitterrand had identified himself so closely with the European Integration Project he staked his reputation on it. Consider the following quote from a French Minister:

About 70% of the population are Pro-Europe, while 70% are anti-Mitterrand, so I would say the result will be about 50-50.

The result was 51-49 in favour. I hope you see what I mean.

Maastricht brings us neatly back to Britain. While the French people were voting to establish the European Union, the British people were watching their elected representatives do the same, as they have done for every Amending Treaty before and after. The last referendum was in 1975 under Harold Wilson on a Europe “in-or-out” ticket.

The debate has never really moved on since.

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